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SOME FOSSILS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
L.m@N J. OAaE*
The inefficiency in the administration of criminal laws in this
country is due largely to the preservation of antiquated and effete
rules of criminal procedure. "Some of the instances of enforcement,"
says Wigmore, "would seem incredible even in the justice of a tribe
of African fetish worshipers."
New subjects of substantive law are being constantly created, old
subjects amplified and adapted to modern social conditions, but the
methods of applying and enforcing these laws have remained essen-
tially unchanged since the American Revolution. The machinery
for the enforcement of criminal laws is carrying year after year an
increasingly greater burden, but there has been no significant changes
in the machinery itself to take care of this increasing burden.
In some respects the administration of criminal justice has ad-
vanced but little beyond that of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors. By their
system the accused was tried by ordeal, by battle, and by compurga-
tion. In these trials no attempt was made to ascertain the facts and
apply human reasoning. The machinery for administering criminal
justice was then concerned only with formalities. The Deity sup-
posedly took care of the facts and saw that right prevailed. It was
incumbent upon the legal tribunal to see that all formalities were
rigidly observed, the judgment itself was judicium Dei. Marked
traces of these barbaric trials persist even to this day.
The rules of criminal procedure in this country today are more
concerned with the preservation of the rules themselves and with the
perfection of a system of formalism and the enforcement of this
formalism. These rules are treated as ends in themselves rather than
as means to an end. The rules of criminal procedure are merely
rules of the game which are preserved with cant and technicality;
and the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence becomes a
subsidiary consideration. This apothoesis of technical formalism in
criminal trials is repugnant to common sense, to social decency and to
common justice.
It is not necessary to make invidious comparisons to show that the
percentage of crime based on population in this country exceeds that
of any other civilized country in the world. This American scandal is
well known to the most casual student.
Our excuse for this orgy of crime surely cannot be lack of intelli-
gence, or poverty, or greater proportion of insanity and feeble mind-
edness, or any number of other social or biological causes. The cause
must be and is the inefficiency of our machinery for the administra-
tion of criminal laws. It is not only significant but is ample proof
* See biographical Note, Page 149.
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of this assertion that the proportion of crime in this country to that
of any other country is in the inverse ratio of the proportion of crim-
inals that are apprehended, convicted and punished here as compared
with other civilized countries. In no other country is there such laxity
in the enforcement of criminal laws. This and this only can be the
reason for our being the most law-violating of all civilized countries.
The enforcement of criminal laws with certainty and celerity would
reduce criminality in this country to the minimum under our exist-
ing social conditions; but to effectively enforce the criminal laws it
would be necessary to abrogate our long established system of ar-
bitrary and technical rules. In England where these rules were cre-
ated, they were abrogated years ago and a simple and common sense
system substituted in their stead.
In the trial of a criminal case there can be but one question for the
legal tribunal, "Is the defendant guilty?" Intelligent rules of
procedure would present the trial of that single question. Such
rules would be merely the means to an end and not the end itself.
They would serve a salutary purpose in assisting the discovery of
facts.
Nevertheless, we adhere to the fossils of criminal procedure and
apply the rules in the trial of criminal cases not as the means of ar-
riving at the ultimate fact at issue, but for the purpose of justifying
the rules themselves. Thus the trial becomes a forensic contest of
wits and the ultimate end is lost sight of in the fogs of technicality.
Preserving technicalities which are of no consequence so far as the
substantive rights of the accused are concerned, causes the collapse
of our entire system of administering criminal justice.
The public complains of the law's delay, the inefficiency of courts,
the manipulation of clever lawyers which prevents cases from being
heard on their merits, and the disgraceful and scandalous laxity in
the enforcement of criminal laws.
Since the lawyers occupy practically all judicial positions and dom-
inate our legislatures, the public may well hold the lawyers respon-
sible for any defects that exist in criminal procedure. The public has
the right to expect that the lawyers, who know best what changes
should be made, will make the necessary changes, and adapt the tools
of their profession to existing conditions, or abrogate them entirely
and adopt a more sensible and workable system.
The reason that our system of administering criminal justice is not
modernized is simply inertia on the part of the legal profession. The
lawyer of all people is closest bound to precedent. He does not often
delve into the history of the rules and often does not know the reason
upon which they are founded, or their historical origin. He knows
them to be rules of the game and as such they are sacred. To destroy
them would be rank heresy. To follow them is part of the lawyer's
idolatrous worship of formalism.
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Slight analysis is sufficient to convince one of the absurdity of many
of the technical rules. A noted example is the one which prevents
the prosecuting attorney from commenting upon the defendant's
failure to testify. This rule, like most others, was founded upon
reason and grew out of necessity. Under the early common law, there
was some danger that the accused would be tortured if he refused to
testify and not until a late date was the accused allowed counsel for
his defense in a criminal trial. To apply this rule now in a court
of justice is the rankest anachronism. The accused knows best the
facts pertaining to the act of which he is charged and if he refuses
to testify, the most logical conclusion is that he is guilty. To deny
this process of reasoning in a court of law is an attempt to turn back
the most natural stream of human reasoning.
The rule that a defendant is presumed to be innocent throughout
the entire trial until he is proven guilty beyond all reasonable doubt
is frequently responsible for the miscarriage of justice. When a man
is indicted and put upon trial, the question should be simply, "Is
he guilty?" To engage in philosophizing about reasonable doubt leads
to no logical determination and becomes a smoke screen behind which
many a guilty culprit makes his escape.
There is no reason whatever for technicalities and formalism in
the indictment or information, and yet the law upon this subject
is highly critical and much involved. The necessity of the indictment
or information arose to counteract tyranny which sometimes decreed
that a man be thrown into prison without knowing the nature of the
offense with which he was charged, and without giving him opportu-
nity of trial, or, if tried, sometimes compelled him to be subjected
to a second or subsequent trial. Thus the requirement that an indict-
ment or information be filed against the accused became a sacred
heritage of a free people, giving the accused an opportunity to pre-
pare for trial and insuring him against double jeopardy. This was
the ancient purpose and it is the purpose today of the indictment
and information, but the accused is not entitled to all the opportu-
nities given him by the many technical and fossilized rules surround-
ing the subject of indictments and informations. The indictment or
information should be held sufficient if it names the offense and states
when and where it was committed as it now is in England. The in-
dictment owes its verbiage and elaborate formalism to its historical
origin; but it cannot be maintained that the use of formal and complex
allegations in the indictment are now necessary as they simply in-
cumber the machinery for administration of criminal justice. Simple
and direct language will serve all useful purposes. Mlany criminals
go unpunished by reason of technical rules with reference to the in-
dictment that have nothing to do with the substantial rights of the
defendants. These rules and many others, are familiar to all lawyers;
and yet they continue in our procedure and help to bring about the
non-enforcement of our criminal laws as a national scandal.
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Much can be said cn the subject of the inefficiency of our police
system and other institutions for the detection of crime and the appre-
hension of criminals. However, whatever may be said on this subject
cannot excuse the existence of our archaic criminal procedure. Crim-
inal procedure must be corrected before any considerable advancement
in the police system can be expected. Even the most ignorant police
officer can reason that it little avails him to apprehend a criminal when
probably the inefficient legal machinery will set the criminal free and
permit him to scornfully laugh at the sworn officers of the law for
their useless officiousness. It would certainly be encouraging to a
police officer to know that if he apprehended a criminal the majesty
of the law would be vindicated with certainty and celerity. Intelli-
gent reformation of our machinery of administering criminal laws will
to a great extent solve the problem of detection and apprehension.
The excuse that is most frequently given for the maintenance of
the present methods of criminal procedure, is the specious argument
that to overturn them would be derogatory of constitutional guar-
anties. It is not maintained that the defendant in a criminal case
should be denied rights guaranteed by the constitution; for the con-
viction of a defendant, however guilty a culprit he may be, is not
justified by proceedings violative of our fundamental law. But these
constitutional guaranties so frequently brought to the defense of the
criminal have as their legitimate purpose the protection of the inno-
cent. The purpose of procedure is regulatory-to secure the orderly
administration of a court of law in the serious business of determining
a substantive fact, the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Matters of
mere procedure are not substantive. The criminal has no right to
their perpetuity for the purpose of preventing punishment for crimes
committed or to prevent a common sense investigation of the real
question before the tribunal.
Too much stress has been put upon the rights of the defendant
and not enough upon the rights of the state. The trial should be fair
to the defendant but equally fair to the state. The defendant's con-
stitutional guaranties must be religiously observed, but in the spirit
in which they came into existence; that is, for the protection of the
innocent and to guard so far as human agencies can against the con-
viction of those who are innocent and unjustly accused of crime.
These constitutional guaranties were never intended to shield from
justice and merited punishment those who are actually guilty and cer-
tainly cannot prevent the institution of such rules of procedure as
would guarantee a fair and expeditious trial to both the defendant
and the state. The present machinery for the administration of
criminal justice has outworn its usefulness and should be relegated to
the museum of barbarism and antiquity. In its stead should be sub-
stituted a system similar to that in England which would insure a
common sense investigation of the facts and would provide for the
enforcement of law with certainty and with celerity.
